Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to use Australian Real Estate Investment Trust (A-REIT) data to empirically examine potential influencing factors on A-REITs becoming a bidder or a target in the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) area. Design/methodology/approach -This study uses logistic regression analysis to investigate the odds of publically traded A-REITs being either a bidder or a target as a function of a number of financial and corporate governance variables. Findings -Prior research in the US REIT M&A area has shown that target size is inversely related to takeover likelihood; in contrast, the authors' Australian results show that size has a positive impact. Prior research on share price and asset performance has shown that underperformance increases the odds of an entity becoming a target, but this paper's results further support these findings and provide confirmation of the inefficient management hypothesis. For acquirers it was found that leverage, cash balances, management structure, the level of shares held by related parties and the global financial crisis have an important impact on bidder likelihood. Practical implications -Given that the literature suggests that investors can earn significant positive abnormal returns by owning targets, but incur significant abnormal losses by owning bidders, at announcement, this study will be useful to fund managers and other investors in A-REITs by investigating the characteristics of those firms that become targets and bidders. Originality/value -This paper adds to the recent US REIT M&A literature by examining the second biggest REIT market in the world and reporting a number of factors that might influence A-REITs to become targets or bidders.
Introduction
Early work by Manne (1965) and Jensen and Ruback (1983) suggest the merger and acquisition (M&A) market, or market for corporate control, as providing useful motivation for managers to maximise shareholder wealth. A great deal of literature has followed examining M&As, with much of the literature evaluating the reasons for the M&A, such as inefficient management, increased market power and excess liquidity or free cash flow (Jensen, 1986 (Jensen, , 1988 . The large majority of the research in the real estate sector has concentrated on the returns around the announcement of a M&A, for example, Ooi et al. (2011) , Ratcliffe et al. (2009 ), Campbell et al. (2001 and Sahin (2005) . However, there has been minimal empirical research on the characteristics of REITs associated with an increased probability of being a target in a M&A announcement, only three papers to date have empirically investigated this area (Eichholtz and Kok, 2008; Frank et al., 2011; Ling and Petrova, 2011) who focused their investigations on the US REIT market. The aim of this paper is to add to this literature and to extend the investigation to the Australian real estate investment trust (A-REIT) sector. Given that the literature advises that investors can earn significant positive abnormal returns by owning targets but incur significant abnormal losses by owning bidders at announcement, it would be quite useful if we could learn about the characteristics of those firms that become targets and bidders.
Results of the logistic model show target share price return is negatively related to a M&A announcement, providing support for the inefficient management hypothesis. We find that a 1 per cent decrease in a firms share price return increases the odds of the A-REIT being a target by almost 25 per cent. Interestingly, we find that size is positively related to takeover likelihood, this result is in contrast to prior real estate literature (Frank et al., 2011; Ling and Petrova, 2011) . This result supports the growth maximisation hypothesises in that bidding firm managers may be more focused on maximising the firms size rather than shareholders wealth. Results for acquiring firms shows that the level of cash has a positive impact on the odds of an A-REIT being a bidder, that is, a 1 million dollar increase in cash holdings increases the odds of a A-REIT being a bidder by 3.2 per cent. We find that the degree of leverage has a negative relationship, a 1 per cent increase in the level of leverage decreases the odds that the A-REIT will be a bidder by almost 97 per cent. Additionally, the study finds the number of shares held by related parties has a negative impact on bidder likelihood, while internally managed A-REITs demonstrate substantially higher odds of being a bidder. These two results combined may be due to externally managed A-REITs, on average, having higher levels of shares held by related parties, thus externally managed A-REITs are unable to compete with their internally managed counterparts in offering target shareholders the best price, due to management fee leakage. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the institutional background of A-REITs, Section 3 provides a discussion of the prior literature. Section 4 contains a description of the study sample and the methodology employed, while Section 5 presents our empirical results and discussions. Finally, Section 6 provides concluding discussions of the main findings.
Institutional background
The A-REIT sector is recognised as a world leader in securitised property, operating in an established regulatory environment providing investors with governance and liquidity (Higgins and Ng, 2009 ). The A-REIT sector sits third behind the USA and the UK in the Jones Lang LaSalle Global Transparency Index (JLL, 2012) . The A-REIT sector is a significant component of domestic financial markets accounting for approximately 6 per cent of the market capitalisation of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) as at November 2012 (Dimovski et al., 2013) . Over the past decade the A-REIT sector has grown from a market capitalisation of approximately $10 billion to a peak of $147 billion in October 2007 prior to the global financial crisis (GFC). The GFC had a significant impact on the A-REIT sector with the market capitalisation falling 68.7 per cent to $46 billion in February 2009, since then the A-REIT sector has rallied to over $87 billion market capitalisation in December 2012. Securitised property trusts serve a vital capital formation function for the real estate market (Allen et al., 2000) . The European Public Real Estate Association (EPRA) note that the A-REIT sector is a significant component of the global REIT market, Australia is ranked second behind the USA, making up 9.36 per cent of the global REIT market and over 43 per cent of the Asia Pacific REIT sector (EPRA, 2012) . Prior to the onset of the GFC, A-REITs experienced strong performance, portfolio diversification benefits, low risk and investor acceptance by both institutional and general investors as demonstrated by previous A-REIT research (Newell and Tan, 2003; Newell, 2005; Lee et al., 2007; Ratcliffe and Dimovski, 2007; Newell and Peng, 2008) . Newell and Peng (2009) highlight the sector performance of A-REITs over a three-year period prior to the GFC, with A-REITs returning an average annual return of over 20 per cent, compared to almost 16 per cent by direct property investment and was the best performing asset class in eight of the 12 years from 1996 to 2007. Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2007) provided evidence of a change in risk profile of A-REITs during their study period of [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] ; the authors suggested that the change was a result of higher debt levels, greater exposure to international property, and a greater reliance on non-passive income. Doble (2009) highlights the divergence by A-REITs away from their core activity and the ability to service their debt commitments as major reasons why A-REITs suffered such large losses during the GFC. Newell and Peng (2009) provided evidence of market returns by A-REITs to support the claims by Doble (2009) , with the average annual return for A-REITs from December 2007 to December 2008 of negative 55.3 per cent, compared to negative 38.9 per cent for equities and a significant underperformance by A-REITs compared most other global REIT markets. During and post the GFC, a large number of A-REITs reduced their debt levels via recapitalisation and restructuring their balance sheets using equity raisings (Newell and Peng, 2009 ). Dimovski and O'Neill (2012) provides evidence of an increase in the average of private equity raised from $112 million during the pre-GFC study period of 2006-2007 compared to $269 million in the post-GFC period of [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] . The outcome of the increased equity raisings has seen the average debt level of A-REITs fall to approximately 26 per cent of assets since the onset of the GFC compared to over 40 per cent at the end of 2007 (Potts, 2012) . Furthermore, there has been a reduction in the proportion of overseas asset holdings, falling from 46 per cent in 2009 (Wist, 2011) to less than 20 per cent in 2012 (BDO, 2012) . Following the restructuring by A-REITs post the GFC has seen a move back to their core business and this re-focussing has resulted in improved performance. Average annual returns for the A-REIT sector for the one and three-year periods ending December 2012 were 32.18 and 10.60 per cent[1], respectively.
Literature review
Prior research into A-REIT M&As has focused on excess returns to shareholders around the announcement of a M&A. Ratcliffe et al. (2009) investigated 36 successful A-REIT M&As from 1995 to 2008, the study found that both targets and bidders earn positive and significant average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of 4.28 and 0.86 per cent, respectively, over the three-day event window [-1, + 1]. When the sample was partitioned by method of payment, the study showed target shareholders received positive and significant CARs of 5.01 per cent for cash financed M&As and 3.90 per cent for scrip and or combination of scrip and cash. Contrary to general corporate finance studies, the study found that bidding A-REITs earn higher CARs when the acquisition was financed by scrip/combination of 1.55 per cent and significant, while cash financed M&As returned negative CARs of 20.22 per cent (but insignificant). The authors concluded that this result is due to the tax transparency of A-REITs and thus the signalling implications of using scrip and or a combination is mitigated in A-REITs. Finally, the study found bidder size to have a significant positive impact on the level of CARs, the authors concluded that this result suggests that the synergistic benefits of A-REIT M&As is due to economies of scale and increased market power. An extension of the study by Ratcliffe et al. (2009) by Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2012a) examined the CARs around announcement for 56 bidding A-REITs involved in public and private acquisitions over the study period of 1996-2010. Results showed, consistent with global REIT research, that bidding shareholders earn higher CARs when the target is privately held compared to public A-REIT targets. Public-private M&As returned positive and significant CARs of 2.83 per cent around the [21, þ 1] event window and public-public results returned significant CARs of þ0.46 per cent. Overall these results are comparable to prior global REIT research. Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2012b) conducted an meta-analysis study on prior REIT M&A research and found bidding REITs earn, on average, positive and significant CARs of 0.719 per cent around the announcement period. While target REITs returned positive and significant CARs of 6.558 per cent. Despite the prior research, no study to date has empirically investigated the potential factors that may influence the probability of an A-REIT becoming a bidder or a target in a M&A. Investigation into the drivers of M&A announcements along with prediction models was developed as an extension of the bankruptcy prediction literature (Barnes, 1999) . Prior research has attempted to identify what key variables may be used to predict a M&A announcement. These variables include financial performance measures, such as equity returns, asset returns, dividend yields and leverage (Arnull-Almond, 2008) . Underperformance, relative to industry peers, in operational or share market performance has shown to increase the probability a firm will become a target Petrova, 2011), Palepu (1986) finds a negative relationship between prior share returns and M&A probability. Studies have also utilised corporate governance measures, for example board composition and ownership structure (Song and Walkling, 1993) . Weir and Laing (2003) found firms with a higher percentage of non-executive directors, higher director shareholding and larger institutional shareholdings were more likely to be targets. Ambrose (1990) investigated the influence corporate real estate assets have on the probability of a company becoming a takeover target. The sample was drawn from non-regulated US industries from 1981 to the end of 1986[2] with a final sample (after screening) of 443 firms, of which 170 were targets and 273 non-targets. Ambrose (1990) hypothesises that real estate assets are a uniquely specialised asset and therefore is an important factor and influential in takeover probability. The study employed a log it regression model to determine what impact holding real estate assets has on a firms probability of becoming a target. Initial investigations found that targets have a significantly higher concentration of real estate ownership compared to non-targets and the log it model showed a positive and significant relationship between real estate ownership and takeover probability. The author concludes that property is a specialised asset and ownership of such assets play an important role in the takeover market. Eichholtz and Kok (2008) examined 95 takeovers of international property companies[3] from 1999 to 2004 by employing a logistic regression model to determine the factors that may influence a M&A announcement for both target and bidders. This study was the first to include bidding firms into the analysis to investigate what factors impact on the probability of a firms being a bidder. The logistic regression results for acquirers showed a positive and significant relationship for size and bidder probability, denoting that bigger firms may have resources and efficiencies that make them more apt at being a bidder. Leverage was found to have a negative impact on bidder probability, suggesting that firms with low debt levels may find it easier to acquire targets. The variance of the share price was also found to have a negative relationship with bidder probability. Finally, the results for portfolio characteristics show that focused firms in the areas of office and retail are more likely to be bidders than those that are diversified or in the area of property development. The investigation into targets by Eichholtz and Kok (2008) shows that both share price return and return on assets has a negative impact on the probability of being a target. That is, firms that experience underperformance are more likely to be a target. This result supports the inefficient management hypothesis and the authors found that this result was consistent for both sub-samples of REITs and non-REITs. The inefficient management hypothesis posits that inefficient allocation of resources may lead to underperformance and thus a takeover bid maybe launched in an attempt to improve the performance of the targets resources by removing or improving the targets' management (Agrawal and Jaffe, 2003) . The corporate governance variables show a negative relationship with insider holdings, whilst the level of block-holders has a significantly positive impact on takeover probability. The findings for insider holdings suggests large insider holdings may deter M&As, indicating "that large inside shareholdings entrench managers rather than reduce the agency gap" (Eichholtz and Kok, 2008, p. 154) . The authors suggest that the level of block-holdings impact on target probability implies that large shareholders are an effective monitoring mechanism and supports the findings of Ling and Ryngaert (1997) . Finally, the market-to-book variable has a negative relationship with target likelihood, indicating that firms with lower market-to-book values may be undervalued, relative to their asset values, and therefore an attractive target. However, when the study separated the sample into REIT and non-REIT, they found this relationship is being driven by the non-REIT firms. The authors suggest this difference may be a result of the transparency of REITs compared to nonREITs, resulting in less information asymmetry. Frank et al. (2011) investigated exit strategies of USREITs from1996 to 2006, strategies studied were public-public M&As, public-private M&As, liquidations and other exit strategies. The most common method for a REIT to exit the REIT universe was via M&A (approximately 83 per cent of the observations in the study exited via either public-public or public-private M&A). Employing logistic regression analysis, the study tested the relationship between potential exit and REIT structural characteristics (variables studies were market capitalisation, debt ratios, profit margin, specialisation and REIT structure). Results show specialised REITs are more likely to be a M&A target than diversified REITs, this result supports prior literature that diversification has a negative impact on the value of REITs (Cronqvist et al., 2001 ). The study also found a negative and significant relationship between size and target probability, suggesting that larger REITs are less likely to be a target of a M&A announcement. Furthermore, the study found evidence that REITs with higher profit margins are more likely to exit the REIT market via M&A than via other exit alternatives. Finally the authors found a significant relationship between the level of debt in a REIT capital structure and M&A probability. Results show that a 1 per cent increase in the debt ratio decreases the probability of being a target by approximately 45 per cent, supporting the claims by Lewellen (1971) that low debt levels may indicate unutilised debt capacity. Ling and Petrova (2011) investigated the characteristics of REITs and M&A likelihood and conditional on being a target, the study further examined what factors of the targets influence the probability of the bidder being public or private. The study sample, after screening, consisted of 161 REIT targets from 1992 to 2007 of which 122 were public-public announcements and 39 public-private. Results of the logistic regression model show that size (measured by total assets) has a negative and significant influence on M&A likelihood, indicating that larger REITs are less likely to become targets. The study also found that higher dividend yielding REITs have a higher probability of receiving a takeover bid, while the estimated coefficient for cash holdings, as a percentage of total assets, has a negative impact, indicating that more liquid firms have a lower takeover probability. Finally, the level of institutional ownership has a positive impact on takeover probability. The authors suggest that this result is due to institutional investors who prefer more liquid shares and larger market capitalisation REITs; this finding is supported by the results for size and cash holdings. Although the prior studies have employed different explanatory variables in their studies, there are some common themes. All studies have shown that size of the target is negatively related to takeover probability with both Frank et al. (2011) and Ling and Petrova (2011) displaying statistical significance. Debt levels also have a negative impact across all three studies, however, only Frank et al. (2011) displays significance, whilst corporate governance variables of institutional ownership and block-holdings also have a positive impact (Eichholtz and Kok, 2008; Ling and Petrova, 2011) . Finally, Eichholtz and Kok (2008) find a strong negative relationship between past performance (share price return and return on assets) and takeover probability, providing support for the inefficient management hypothesis.
Sample and method
Data collection A-REIT M&As were identified from the Connect 4 Takeovers Database[4] and the ASX announcements over the period of January 1999 to December 2011. The first day the M&A announcement is made public is defined as the "announcement date". This study is concerned with the characteristics of A-REITs that are involved in a M&A announcement, not the resultant outcome and impact on shareholders wealth. The second date of importance in the development of the sample is the "information date" and is defined as the month end prior to the M&A announcement and at least 30 days prior the announcement date. Potential firms were subjected to the following screens before they were included in the sample:
. both bidder and target are listed entities and are classified as A-REITs; and . had three years of continuous share price and accounting data prior the information date.
Our final sample included 56 A-REIT targets of which 50 of the announcements were successful and 31 A-REIT acquirers, with only one announcement being unsuccessful. Table I provides a summary of the top 15 targets and bidders, the date of the announcement and their market capitalisation the day prior the announcement.
To develop an accurate investigation of the A-REIT M&A market we use a random sample of A-REITs as control firms that are temporally matched (Eichholtz and Kok, 2008) to targets and bidders. Temporal matching involves randomly assigning two control firms to each acquirer and target with matching information dates. Ambrose (1990) notes that this method eliminates the problems of matching data from varying time periods and allowing direct comparisons between each sub-groups without having to adjust for financial trends. We excluded A-REITs from the control sample if:
. they themselves were involved in a M&A during the sample period;
. had missing accounting and share price data; or . the firm was not continuously listed. The final sample for the target model is 168 and 93 for the acquirers model, allowing a control A-REIT to be in the sample more than once. Monthly share price data and accounting data was collected from the DatAnalysis [5] . All accounting variables were collected from the individual firms annual reports over a three year period ending in the fiscal year prior the information date. Monthly share price data was collected for three years prior the information date.
Methodology
This study employs a general logit probability model as described by Powell (2001) , Barnes (1999) , Ambrose (1990) and Palepu (1986) to investigate the probability of publically traded A-REITs being either a bidder or a target as a function of a number of financial and corporate governance variables. The parameters of each target and acquirers model were estimated using the STATA statistical package (Kohler and Kreuter, 2012) :
where TARG is a binary value, if the A-REIT was a target during the sample period they take on the value of 1, otherwise 0. BID is also a 0/1 value, if the A-REIT made a M&A announcement during the sample period, they are assigned 1. The independent variables are selected from prior research into the area of general and real estate specific M&A prediction studies.
Size SIZE is defined as the market capitalisation of the REIT on the information date. Kohler and Kreuter (2012) note that using a dollar value in such studies may result in the variable (market size in this case) to be heavily skewed to the right. To account for this, the authors suggest the value to be adjusted using log base-2.Two conflicting views appear in the literature with regards to size and M&A likelihood. Palepu (1986) suggests with size comes higher transaction costs resulting in a negative relationship between size and probability of being a target. Alternatively, Barnes (1999) suggests a positive relationship because management is fundamentally focused on increasing the size of the company. Frank et al. (2011) both found a significant negative relationship between size and probability of being a target in their study of US REITs, concluding that larger REITs, all else equal, are less likely to become M&A targets. As for bidding firms and size, Eichholtz and Kok (2008) found a strong positive relationship between the size and the probability of being a bidder.
Return RET is the average monthly share price return over three years prior the M&A announcement finishing at the information date. The inefficient management hypothesis suggests that inefficient use of resources leads to underperformance, thus M&As are driven by the need to improve the use of the target's resources by replacing the target's management (Agrawal and Jaffe, 2003) . Frank et al. (2011) utilised profit margins as a proxy for performance leading up to a M&A announcement and found lower profit margins increased the likelihood of being a takeover target. Poor share price performance prior to a M&A announcement may suggest that management are not operating effectively, Eichholtz and Kok (2008) found a significant negative relationship between share price return and the probability of being a target. In the case of bidding firms share price performance prior to making an announcement, we hypothesise a positive relationship. Eichholtz and Kok (2008) found a positive relationship between return and being a bidder, however, the value was not significant.
Leverage LEV is the firms leverage and is calculated as short-term debt plus long-term debt divided by the shareholders equity. Low levels of leverage may signal unutilised debt capacity, which may be attractive to a bidding firm (Lewellen, 1971) . Alternatively, firms with high levels of debt in their capital structure may provide bidding firms with the opportunity to capture synergistic benefits (Myers and Majluf, 1984) . Campbell et al. (2001) posit that highly levered REITs (with low historical growth rates) may find it difficult to reduce their leverage levels due to the high payout ratios required by law. Prior real estate predictive models have found a negative relationship (Eichholtz and Kok, 2008; Frank et al., 2011; Ling and Petrova, 2011) , however, only Frank et al. (2011) results display statistical significance. In the case of the bidders model, Jensen (1986) suggests that firms with higher financial leverage make better investment decisions due to their lower levels of financial-slack. Maloney et al. (1993, p. 189 ) provide evidence to support this view and conclude "that debt improves managerial decision making". Alternatively, due to the legally imposed high payout ratio of REITs and hence lower levels of retained earnings, firms with lower levels of leverage may find it easier to acquire targets and use their excess debt capacity to finance the acquisition (Campbell et al., 2001 ). Eichholtz and Kok (2008) found a strong negative relationship between leverage and the probability of being a bidder, providing support for real estate firms valuing financial slack.
Shares held by related parties Prior real estate research has suggested that in regulated industries with a low active takeover market, the importance of external governance processes is diminished and replaced by internal governance controls . Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) suggest that large insider holdings explain the absence of hostile takeovers in REITs. North (2001) provides evidence of a negative relationship between managerial ownership and takeover likelihood, suggesting that managerial ownership helps managers maintain control. This result is consistent with Eichholtz and Kok (2008) who find a significant negative relationship between insider holdings and takeover probability. Shares held by related parties (SHR) is defined as the percentage of shares held by directors and their related parties plus the percentage of shares held by the management company and their related parties.
Dividend yield DIVYIELD is the average annual dividend yield over three years prior. Alzueta and Lucey (2010) and Arnold-Almond (2008) hypothesis that low dividend ratio firms are using their retained earnings to maintain/create financial slack to take advantage of future investment opportunities. This, in turn, increases the probability of a firm being a target since such investment is likely to increase the performance and growth of the target firm. However, Ling and Petrova (2011) report the opposite in the case of REIT M&As, finding that a higher payout ratio increases the probability of being a takeover target. Accordingly, for acquirers, we hypothesise that acquiring A-REITs value the ability to use cash to finance an acquisition and therefore a negative relationship to exist between dividend payout ratio and bidder probability.
Focus/diversification FOCUS is a measure of the specialisation/diversification of the A-REIT by property type and is calculated using the calculated using the Hirscham-Herfindahl index (Hirscham, 1964) a score close to one means the REIT is highly focused, whereas a score close to zero is a diversified REIT. Frank et al. (2011) provide evidence that diversified REITs exhibit a lower probability of being targets, this result supports prior research on real estate firms that diversification has a negative impact on value (Capozza and Seguin, 1999; Cronqvist et al., 2001 ).
Cash CASH is the cash balance reported in the A-REITs annual reports. Again, due to the regulatory payout/retained earnings restrictions on REITs, it is argued that REITs with higher levels of cash balances would be more likely to participate in a M&A compared to other REITs. Womack (2012) found that REITs use a combination of equity and cash in 75 per cent of REIT transactions. Prior research by Eichholtz and Kok (2008) found a negative but insignificant relationship between bidders and M&A announcements. Ling and Petrova (2011) found a negative and slightly significant relationship between targets and cash as percentage of total assets. The authors concluded that more liquid REITs have a lower probability of being a target.
Price-to-book value PVBV is the A-REITs closing share price on the last day of the firm's financial year divided by the shareholders equity per share. This variable has been used extensively is prior studies as a proxy for undervaluation (Ambrose, 1990; Powell, 2001; Ling and Petrova, 2011) . Firms with low market values relative to their book values would be considered to be "bargain" (Powell, 1997) and thus are more likely to be a target. Eichholtz and Kok (2008) provide support for undervaluation with real estate targets exhibiting a significant negative relationship.
Management structure MGMT is an identifier dummy variable for the A-REITs management structure, a value of 1 depicts that the REIT is internally managed. Capozza and Seguin (2000, p. 92) examined the performance of externally and internally managed REITs and found that "externally managed REITs under-perform and are priced at a discount relative to their internally managed counterparts". Tan (2004) identified that internally managed REITs have improved management, lower cost of capital, no fee leakage and reduced agency costs. Given this we expect internally managed A-REITs to have an advantage in an acquisition. Furthermore, externally managed A-REITs should be more likely to become a M&A target.
Global financial crisis Dimovski (2009) Prior studies have highlighted the importance of industry relative ratios as an independent variable in the analysis (Powell, 2001; Arnull-Almond, 2008) , however, by investigating only the A-REIT sector allows the research to focus on the variables of interest without having to control for the large number of other issues that can affect the results in studies that include mergers across industries (Campbell et al., 2005) . Furthermore, Ling and Petrova (2011) suggests an industry effect may be the driver for mixed results in prior studies that have attempted to predict M&A targets using firm-level data from multiple industries.
Summary statistics and univariate analysis Panel A of Table II provides summary statistics for the key variables employed in the empirical investigation of target A-REITs along with the difference in means. Interestingly, we find that target REITs are, on average, larger than the control sample and this difference is significant. This result is in contrast to the findings by Frank et al. (2011) who investigated US REITs from 1996 to 2006. This outcome maybe a result of the introduction of the Managed Investments Act 1998 that allowed for the introduction of a single responsible entity role post June 2000, paving the way for externally managed A-REITs to merge with their management companies becoming self-managed entities (Dimovski, 2010) . For example, our data sample contains the stapling of the Westfield Group and DB RREEF Trust[6] which suggests that there may have been a focus by A-REITs to achieve greater size. We investigate this outcome further in the logistic model results. Consistent with prior research by Eichholtz and Kok (2008) and Frank et al. (2011) we find share price returns to be lower for target REITs and slightly significant when compared to the control sample, providing support for the inefficient management hypothesis. However, in contrast to Eichholtz and Kok (2008) we find that target REITs are significantly less levered than our control group. Zhilan et al. (2007) posit that the 95 per cent payout requirements of REITs results in low free-cash-flow balances and the discount on seasoned equity issues due to information asymmetries implies that REITs prefer first to issue debt to raise funds, utilising pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) . Given this, our result indicates that A-REITs with excess debt capacity in their capital structure are attractive to acquiring REITs. We also note that targets have lower dividend yields, but have higher cash levels, this result is in line with Jensen (1986) free cash flow theorem, however, neither variable shows statistical significance. Our univariate analysis provides support for the inefficient management hypothesis and is consistent with Eichholtz and Kok (2008) who provided evidence of underperformance along with low dividend yield suggesting that M&A targets are in a weak financial position. Panel B of Table II provides the summary statistics for the acquirers model. Consistent with Eichholtz and Kok (2008) and Ratcliffe et al. (2009) we find that bidding A-REITs on average are larger, supporting the theory that larger REITs have more market power in M&As and have an economies of scale advantage for integrating the targets assets. Similarly, we find that bidding A-REITs have lower levels of leverage, this is consistent with the pecking order theory (Feng et al., 2007) in that financial slack is valuable in the capital structure of A-REITs. The shares held by related parties variable shows a strong significance, acquirers have a lower percentage of shares held by directors plus the management companies. This result is similar to Eichholtz and Kok (2008) who found acquirers have lower levels of insider holdings, compared to their control sample. However, Campbell et al. (2011) suggests higher levels of insider holdings has a positive impact on bidding REITs abnormal returns in a takeover. We explore this variable in more detail in the logit regression results.
Table II. Descriptive statistics and difference in means tests
The management result suggests that internally managed A-REITs are more likely to be bidders than their externally managed counterparts, this is consistent with Ambrose and Linneman (2001) who suggest that internally managed REITs are more competitive in terms of cost of capital and rental revenue than their externally managed counterparts. Finally, the cash variable for bidding A-REITs is higher compared to the control group. This result, along with size and leverage, suggests that bidding REITs are in a healthy financial position and are looking at avenues to increase market size and asset growth, further supporting the claims by Moody's Investors Service (MIS, 2006) and Ratcliffe et al. (2009) .
Results and discussions
The results of the logistic regression model for targets is presented in Table III , panel A utilises all the predictor variables, while panel B explores a model with fewer predictor variables. Consistent with our univariate results, we find that size is positively related to an A-REIT being a target. This result supports the growth maximisation hypothesises proposed by Marris (1963) , which suggests that acquiring firm managers are more concerned with maximising the firms size rather than shareholders wealth. However, MIS (2006) and Ratcliffe et al. (2009) discuss that Australia has a high level of institutional grade property that has already been securitised and suggest that size and asset growth are important areas for A-REITs to improve returns and attract capital. Given this, we hypothesise that a major avenue to achieving this growth in size and assets, is through acquisition. We find share price performance is negatively related the likelihood of a M&A bid, this result is consistent with Eichholtz and Kok (2008) and Frank et al. (2011) and supports the inefficient management hypothesis. The coefficients for the variables leverage, price-to-book value and focus are consistent with prior real estate research; however, the variables do not display significance. The dividend yield coefficient, although not significant, shows that lower yielding A-REITs have a higher probability of becoming a target; this supports the findings of Eichholtz and Kok (2008) who suggest low yielding trusts are in a weak financial position, further supporting the inefficient management hypotheses.
Table III. REIT targets logit estimation results
Panel C of Table III displays the logistic results after the removal of targets that were involved in the stapling of the A-REIT from externally to internal management [7] . We identified and removed 11 targets that were involved in a stapling arrangement along with their matched non-target firms, resulting in a decrease of 33 observations. The results provide robustness to our initial results, showing that size is positively and significantly related to target probability. The coefficient for return remains negative and significant at the 5 per cent level, further supporting the inefficient management hypothesis. We hypothesise that the lower p-values listed are a result of the decrease in the number of observations which impact on the degrees of freedom when calculating the significance.
Table IV displays the logit results for the acquiring A-REITs, panel A utilises all the predictor variables, while panel B drops the dividend yield variable which does not appear useful. In both models we find leverage has a negative and significant impact on the probability of an A-REIT being a bidder. This suggests that bidding A-REITs with financial slack in their capital structure are more likely to enter into a M&A. This result supports Eichholtz and Kok (2008) and Zhilan et al. (2007) findings. Consistent with the univariate analysis, we find cash to have a positive relationship with bidder likelihood; this is in contrast to Eichholtz and Kok (2008) who found a negative but insignificant relationship. The findings for leverage and cash combined support the discussion by Ling and Petrova (2011) who found a shift to cash financing in REITM&As. The authors noted that during the period of 2004-2007 the cost of debt was at low levels and easily accessible, along with a period of increased REIT profitability and the negative signalling effect of using stock. These circumstances combined suggest that the use of cash over stock in an acquisition "may provide insights into the motivation behind these transactions" (Ling and Petrova, 2011, p. 112) .
The result for the shares held by related parties variable shows a strong negative relationship across both models. This result supports the findings of Eichholtz and Kok (2008) and North (2001) who found a negative relationship between managerial ownership and takeover likelihood, suggesting that managerial ownership helps managers maintain control. We also find a positive relationship between the management variable and bidder probability, supporting the findings by Ambrose and Linneman (2001) . These two results are related in that A-REITs with a high level of related party ownership are often externally managed REITs, with the management company often having a large ownership stake in the trust. It therefore may be argued that externally managed A-REITs are unable to compete with an internally managed A-REIT in offering target shareholders the best price, due to management fee leakage. The findings of Capozza and Seguin (2000) and Greer and Parker (2005) provide support for this hypothesis by noting that internally managed REITs have reduced agency costs, greater financial flexibility in debt funding and a lower cost of capital. Therefore, an internally managed REIT would be able to outbid (or offer a better price upfront, thus resulting in no counter-bidding) due to its more efficient structure. Finally, we find a strong positive relationship for the pre-GFC variable, suggesting that the A-REIT market prior to the GFC was an era of takeovers. This result supports the findings of Dimovski (2009) and suggests that the GFC has caused a structural shift in the A-REIT market. However, we acknowledge that this result is possibly being driven by the data set and the lack of observation post GFC and believe that this is an area for future investigations as more M&A announcements occur. Finally, we present Table V, this table provides Table VII shows the odds ratio results for bidding A-REITs, a 1 per cent increase in leverage decreases the odds that A-REIT will be a bidder by almost 97 per cent, whilst a 1 million dollar increase in cash holdings increases the odds of being a bidder by 3.2 per cent. It should be noted that the management and pre-GFC independent variables are dummy variables, thus a one unit change in these variables which for all practical purposes is highly improbable or even impossible, means that with the management variable, the A-REIT would need to change from externally to an internally managed A-REIT. If this was to occur it would increase the probability of the A-REIT becoming a bidder by 587 per cent. The pre-GFC odds ratio suggests that there are extremely higher odds that a REIT will be a bidder prior to the GFC than post (and practically impossible), however, as we discussed earlier, this result may be driven by the number of observations post GFC. Finally the shares held by related parties variable shows that a 1 per cent increase in the holdings by related parties will decrease the odds the A-REIT will be a bidder by 99.9 per cent, further supporting prior research that managerial ownership increases management control and thus decreasing takeover likelihood (North, 2001) . Furthermore, as discussed earlier, we hypothesis that the shares held by related parties and the management structure results are related, in that A-REITs with high levels of related party ownership are often externally managed. Therefore, the results suggest that externally managed A-REITs are not as efficient as their internally managed counterparts when it comes to M&As. The implication of our results for A-REITs as they recover from the impact of the GFC suggests that A-REITs that are self-managed are more likely to be bidders and lower levels of shares held by related parties reduce management entrenchment. Furthermore, as A-REITs look to increase their size via acquisition they need to maintain lower debt levels and higher cash holdings, as highlighted by Ling and Petrova (2011) .
Conclusions
This study employs a logistic regression analysis to test the probability of publically traded A-REITs being involved in a M&A as a function of a number of financial and corporate governance variables. Consistent with prior research by Eichholtz and Kok (2008) we find support for the inefficient management hypothesis; in that poor performing A-REITs have a higher probability of becoming targets. In contrast to prior US REIT research (Frank et al., 2011; Ling and Petrova, 2011) we find that size is positively related to the likelihood of being a target in the A-REIT market. This result supports the growth maximisation hypothesis, however, this result may also be due to the recognition that size and asset growth are important areas for A-REITs to improve returns and attract capital.
Table VI. REIT targets odds ratio results
We find that the probability of an A-REIT being a bidder is increased when they have lower levels of leverage, higher cash balances, are internally managed and have lower levels of shares held by related parties. We also find that the GFC has had an impact of the M&A market in A-REITs, the results show that there was a far greater likelihood that an A-REIT would make a M&A announcement before the GFC than post. The limited number of observations post GFC may have an impact on this result and therefore it is an area of future research as the A-REIT market recovers and we observe more M&A announcements. 7. The stapling of these A-REITs is still effectively a merger in its definition as the firms are subject to ASX listing rules in relation to disclosure and shareholder approval.
